On 9 July 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“Court”) announced its decision in the case Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin v European Commission (T-188/24). The decision confirms the EU Commission’s authority to conduct a dawn raid at Michelin’s premises in the context of an ongoing cartel investigation in the tyre sector (Case AT.40863), concerning alleged price signaling through public communications such as earnings calls.

The Court upheld the legality of the EU Commission’s inspection order, finding that the EU Commission had established a reasonable suspicion that Michelin and other major tyre producers coordinated future pricing intentions via public statements. The EU Commission’s suspicion was based on AI-assisted analysis of hundreds of thousands of earnings call transcripts, using bigram-based keyword searches to detect patterns in statements about strategic decisions and competitor behavior. Quantitative irregularities in language use, corroborated by manual qualitative review, justified the initial investigative step according to the Court.

Michelin had argued that the EU Commission’s decision lacked sufficient reasoning and violated its right to respect for its premises and communications, claiming the suspicion was arbitrary and that the content of earnings calls could be explained by legitimate transparency obligations of French law and external market conditions. The Court rejected these claims, emphasizing that early-stage inspections do not require detailed legal assessment and that the EU Commission had adequately substantiated its grounds.

The judgment underscores that public signaling of pricing intentions – even through routine investor communications – may constitute a concerted practice or even a by-object restriction of competition if competitors act upon or reciprocate such signals. The Court acknowledged the legitimacy of earnings calls as part of corporate transparency but stressed that this does not preclude antitrust scrutiny.

The decision also highlights the increasing use of AI-based investigative tools by the EU Commission. The case arose from proactive screening of publicly available market data across sectors, reflecting the EU Commission’s shift towards digital evidence-gathering amid declining leniency applications and traditional cartel notifications.

This monitoring could serve as a significant new information source for the EU Commission, as leniency applications from cartel members have significantly decreased in recent years due to their effect on follow-on damages actions in national courts. Consequently, the frequency of cartel investigations and penalties levied by the EU Commission is diminishing. It can therefore be expected that the EU Commission, relying predominantly on reports from its whistleblower tool and customer complaints, will strive to enhance its investigative efforts by leveraging new technologies.